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Абстракт 
Настоящее исследование носит одновременно концептуальный и прикладной характер. Авторы 
уделяют особое внимание определению сущности понятия интеграция мигрантов, его 
соотношению с понятиями ассимиляция и адаптация, вводят понятия полной и частичной 
интеграции. Подробно рассмотрено, как на смену игнорированию вопроса интеграции 
мигрантов в российской государственной миграционной политике в 1990-х и начале 2000-х гг. 
с большим опозданием, но все же пришло понимание того, что это тесно взаимосвязанные 
сферы государственной деятельности для такой страны, как Россия, которая ежегодно 
принимает миллионы мигрантов, постоянных и временных. Пример России четко 
свидетельствует, что самоустранение государства из этой сферы внутренней политики 
оборачивается обострением межэтнической напряженности, снижением уровня толерантности 
в обществе, отчуждением мигрантов со стороны российского общества, их самоизоляцией, 
открытыми конфликтами между мигрантами и местным населением. Так что теперь, когда 
интеграция мигрантов осознана, наконец, как исключительно актуальная задача, разработка и 
осуществление политики интеграции осложняется тем, что она происходит на исключительно 
неблагоприятном фоне роста ксенофобии и общей политизированности миграционной темы. В 
статье подробно анализируется политика интеграции мигрантов, осуществляемая  с 2007 г в 
отношении переселяющихся в Россию "соотечественников" - наиболее привилегированной 
группы иммигрантов, а также дается оценка политике адаптации временных трудовых 
мигрантов в свете последних государственных инициатив 2012 года. Кроме того, авторы 
рассуждают об  интеграционном и анти-интеграционном потенциале этнических диаспор в 
условиях, когда – как это имеет место в современной России – официальная инфраструктура 
приема и интеграции мигрантов не имеет должного развития. 
Abstract 
The present article is both theoretical and applied. The authors attempt to establish what the 
integration of migrants means and how said integration corresponds to the terms assimilation and 
adaptation. They also offer a classification of complete and partial integration. The paper retraces how 
a disregard for migrant integration in Russia in the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s was gradually 
replaced by an understanding that these were closely interrelated State spheres. This interrelation was 
particularly true for a country like Russia, which annually receives millions of migrants, both for 
permanent and temporary stays. The experience of Russia clearly demonstrates that the dissociation of 
the State from this important sphere of internal policy leads to: ethnic tensions; erosion of tolerance in 
society; alienation of migrants from Russian society; self-isolation; and open conflicts between 
migrants and local residents. Therefore, now that the integration of migrants has been understood to be 
an important issue in Russia, the elaboration and realization of the migrant integration policy is 
complicated by xenophobia and a politically-loaded perception of migration. The Russian policy of 
migrant integration is evaluated in respect of the most privileged category of immigrants: Russian 
“compatriots”. The adaptation policy of temporary labor migrants is analyzed in the context of the 
Russian State’s 2012 initiatives. The authors also set out the integration and the anti-integration 
potential of ethnic diasporas when – as in present-day Russia – the infrastructure for the admission and 
integration of migrants has not been properly developed. 
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Introduction 
The notion of migrant integration as a process leading to their “inclusion” in the society of host 
countries, their adaptation and further adaptability to this society is a relatively new one: it became the 
subject of wide public discussions and state policy in European countries in the last third of the 
twentieth century. In the last decade, with continuously growing migrant inflows, and disputes about 
different migrant integration models, the whole question has become particularly pressing.  
We believe that the lack of clear understanding of the essence of migrant integration and 
classification has become one of the reasons for the failure of migrant integration policy implemented 
in the last decades in European countries. Indeed, at some point Europeans began to avoid the term 
“integration”, replacing it with another notion – “inclusion”. Then, at the end of 2000s, they admitted 
the complete failure of multiculturalism  as applied in most European countries.  
The search for new migrant integration policies in host countries takes place under difficult 
conditions. On the one hand, there is an objective growth of immigration inflows, which is stimulated 
by labor market demands. Then, on the other, , anti-immigration attitudes rise in societies that have 
failed to adapt to previous inflows of immigrants (Massey and Sanchez 2010). 
For Russia – the largest recipient of migrants in the post-Soviet space – a conceptual discussion 
about migrant integration policy is particularly relevant. First, its experience in the sphere of 
international migration management is relatively limited. Until recently, indeed, the integration of 
migrants was not taken into consideration at all as part of migration policy. Second, today, when 
migrant integration has been finally conceptualized as an extremely important task, the development 
and implementation of any integration policy is complicated by the fact that it takes place against a 
backdrop of xenophobia and inter-ethnic tension associated to migration.  
The goal of this research is to develop a conceptual basis for integration policies in modern Russia. 
We offer a definition of integration and classification of integration policy mechanisms, which might 
be relevant for implementation in modern Russia. What is even more important, we develop the 
typology of migrant groups which can and should be the object of any national integration policies. 
Obviously, there is different integration depth between migrants who come to Russia for a permanent 
stay, and for temporary labor migrants. However, we are convinced that besides this, it is crucial to 
make a distinction among four categories. First, migrants from “newly independent states” and from 
non-CIS countries;  second, migrants from newly independent states, that is migrants who are closer in 
terms of ethnicity and religion (migrants with Russian ancestry, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Moldovans), 
and less close (representatives of titular nations from Central Asia and Transcaucasia); third, migrants 
with Russian ancestry,who left Russia relatively recently, not long before the collapse of the USSR, 
and those  “Russians” who settled  in other countries long ago; fourth, migrants representing titular 
nations of other CIS countries including those who view themselves as part of their own diasporas 
residing on the territory of the Russian Federation, and those who do not join a diaspora.  It is also 
important to see how migrant integration policy has developed in present-day Russia in the framework 
of national migration policy. More particularly, it is important to see how it appeared in the format of 
national policy with regards to the facilitation and relocation of fellow Russians to Russia; a special, 
preferential immigrant category. 
But before we start examining different migrant integration models in Russia, we would like first to 
review the conceptual framework explaining the essence and complex structure of the notion of 
“migrant integration”. 
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Understanding Migrant Integration: Conceptual Framework 
Generally, integration can be classified into complete integration based on the assimilation of 
migrants, and partial integration including adaptation and survival processes. Classification of notions 
defining various degree of migrant integration is presented in Figure 1. 
Assimilation of migrants means the process by which migrants who differ from the population of the 
country where they are staying in terms of their values, traditions and culture, transform their self-
identification. It is a question of how they adapt to the surrounding community, and to what extent they 
renounce their unique identity. The assimilation process can be universal or partial. For example, in the 
course of assimilation people may lose their language, self-definition, traditional structures, while 
maintaining, say,  their religious views, and everyday traditions: this is the form of assimilation found in 
the United States. Migrant assimilation may come out in social, economic, political, and even 
demographic terms: the demographic behavior of assimilated migrants (marriage and birth rate models) 
becomes close, if not identical, to the behavior that is characteristic for the host society in general. 
Figure 1. Classification of notions defining various degree of migrant integration 
 
 
 
An important factor in assimilation is interethnic marriages: international marriages which are at the 
root of our conception of the fourth demographic transition (see Iontsev and Prokhorova 2011). At the 
same time we would like to note that the ethnic self-identification of children born in such marriages 
depends, to a great extent, on the ethnicity of the leading spouse, as well as on a number of infrastructural 
factors: for example, policy with respect to ethnic minorities in a given country (Topilin 2010).  
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also characteristic of migrants who join the indigenous population in their new home country, and 
gradually become part of said population.  
Forced assimilation is national policy aimed at the destruction – though not the physical destruction 
– of the separate identity of a certain ethnicity. The following tools can be used as tools of forced 
assimilation: limiting language use with the subsequent withdrawal of a language from circulation 
altogether; eradication of national traditions (ban on celebration of national holidays, performance of 
national rituals); the promotion of the kinds of activities which are not characteristic for this or that 
ethnicity, etc. These kinds of policies often deform the system of values of both resident and migrant 
groups. Thse policies provoke resistance on the part of the assimilated nation, its tendency to show 
ethnic restraint and artificial emphasis for characteristic features. 
Forced assimilation is a potential source of interethnic conflicts. Forced assimilation should be 
distinguished from cultural survival. This is characteristic of, for example, migrants in developed 
Western countries, where the quick assimilation of new migrants is an essential condition for their 
successful social and economic adaptation. 
One nation can proactively assimilate several other nations: thus, Russians assimilated multiple 
Finnish and Turkish ethnic groups. But in certain cases, especially in the case of small groups residing 
on the territory of traditional settlements of other nations, it can become the object of assimilation. 
Assimilation strengthens in the period of stable public life. And, vice versa, economic and social 
instability is a serious impediment in assimilation processes. Thus, in modern Russia the development 
of assimilation processes is obviously slowed down by widely spread interethnic conflicts and a 
growing anti-immigrant spirit in society.  
Speaking of the partial integration of migrants (here we refer first of all to temporary labor 
migrants), we need to define two notions, such as adaptation and adaptability. As a matter of fact, the 
integration process starts with adaptation, i.e. a person adjusting to new life and labor conditions. The 
adaptability of migrants can, in its turn, be defined as a phenomenon which is composed of adaptation 
on one hand, and adjustment to living conditions, on the other, namely settlement in the new place. 
Essentially, this means the process by which migrants achieve the same level of prosperity as the 
indigenous population. As a rule, a significant time is required for settling down, more than the time 
necessary for adaptation, without which, of course, adaptability cannot be achieved.  
Obviously, integration involves a totality of immigrant actions and beliefs as well as the actions 
and beliefs of the indigenous population. The actions of the latter group are especially important 
because they define and have a strong impact on the conditions of immigrant acceptance and the 
structural conditions of their stay. Therefore, they direct the national identification of immigrants 
either towards integration, or in the opposite direction, i.e. unwillingness to integrate. 
Thus, it is important to emphasize that the integration of migrants is a bilateral process aimed at 
the assimilation and adaptability of migrants in the host society. This may contribute to both the 
economic and demographic development of this society. This not only refers to the host society’s 
attitude towards migrants, but also to the unwillingness of migrants to integrate in a given society. 
When this binarity is broken, it makes it impossible for migrants to integrate completely. A vivid 
example of this kind of failure is the statements made by European leaders, Angela Merkel and David 
Cameron about “the failure of multiculturalism” in Europe. They imply that migrants themselves were 
the ones to blame for this failure, as migrants could not, or were not willing to accept European norms 
and values. But how could these migrants, especially migrants from the Arab world, integrate in the 
Western society if they were subject to migrant enclaves, i.e. compact settlements of migrants, isolated 
from the indigenous population? We have to recognize that, in certain senses, Russia is repeating the 
sad experience of Western countries. It allows, certainly, the  same kind of enclaves to form in 
Moscow, Saint Petersburg, and other large cities, and thus willingly or unwillingly creates 
impediments towards the complete integration of migrants. 
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Migrant Integration in Russian Migration Policy  
Migrant integration is, as a subject of national policy, a relatively new issue for modern Russia, though 
there Russia has some experience in this sphere.  
In Soviet times population migration was almost exclusively internal. Given that the USSR was a 
multinational state, this internal migration created a “mix of nations”. National policy favoured 
internationalism: the notion of “Soviet people” was full of real meaning something ensured by a 
common language, a single school curriculum across the whole country, not to mention equality of 
rights and living conditions for all citizens. With all the rigidness of the Soviet political system the 
state provided conditions for the social and economic integration of migrants wherever they were 
relocated: they provided jobs, housing, education for migrants and their children, etc.  
The situation changed radically after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Policy related to the internal 
migration of the population in Russia was shelved. The government concentrated, instead, on the 
creation of a fundamentally new legislation and institutional structure for international migration. This 
was understood in very narrow terms, as the legal administrative regulation of migration processes.  
In the 1990s, despite the large-scale inflow of migrants from the former Soviet republics, there was 
no migrant integration policy in place. There was no mention of the integration of migrants relocating to 
Russia in national migration policy documents. And there were reasons for this. Initially the migration 
inflow to Russia (which in some years climbed as high as 1 million) included ethnic Russians and 
representatives of other ethnicities indigenous to Russia: these found themselves in the “wrong”  Soviet 
republic, as the USSR came crashing down. Migrants with similar ethnic backgrounds did not, it was 
considered, need any special conditions for social and psychological adaptation: for example they did not 
need classes in Russian or Russian culture and history. Also, the conditions for the social and economic 
integration of migrants (not least, providing work and housing) were quite limited, due to the economic 
crisis Russia experienced at that point. Even when, at the beginning of the 2000s, titular nations of the 
CIS accounted for a significant share of migration flows directed towards Russia, migration policy did 
not touch on integration. For example, the “Concept of regulation of migration processes in the Russian 
Federation”, approved in 2003, does not mention integration issues. It was, only, in the 2000s that the 
notion of “integration” started to appear in Russian research literature (for example, Mukomel 2005, 
2007; Pyadukhov 2003; Astvatsaturova 2002).  
Ignorance towards the need for integration policy resulted in a decreased level of tolerance in 
society, raising interethnic tension, migrants being alienated by Russian society, self-isolating, open 
conflicts between migrants and the local population. It became absolutely obvious that given the mass 
inflow of migrants – even if from historically close, newly independent states –integration should be 
an integral element of migration policy. This was also acknowledged in the new “Concept of national 
migration policy of the Russian Federation through to 2025” approved in June 2012. The Federal 
Migration Service of Russia elaborated and approved certain specific programs in the field ensuring 
the integration of migrants in Russian society. A Department for the facilitation of migrant integration 
was created in the structure of FMS. And it was planned that, by 2016, “an infrastructure for 
integration and adaptation of labor migrants” should be created. 
However for migrant integration policy to be efficient, there needs to be a clear understanding of 
what integration really means. This includes various questions, inter alia: which tools can be 
implemented with regards to different groups of migrants; how big these groups are; and  their specifics; 
and their social, economic, and demographic behavior. In other words, integration policy should have a 
reliable informational and conceptual foundation, something which is currently lacking in Russia.  
Research into migrant integration in Russia has only a short history. National statistics available on 
international migrants provides very little data in order to get a reliable estimation of their integration 
Migrant Integration Models in Modern Russia 
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in the Russian society1. Sociological surveys on this subject2
In order to understand how the migrant integration process takes place, and whether, indeed, it 
takes place at all, and its depth in different migrant categories, we need a broad range of indicators. 
These indicators will characterize the degree of  inclusion in various spheres of public life, as well as 
comparative analyses of indigenous people and migrants. They naturally include such key indicators 
as position in the labor market, accessibility of education, participation in public and political life and 
work against discrimination. For thirty states (European Union countries, Norway, Switzerland, the 
USA and Canada) information of this kind is calculated through MIPEX index (Migrant Integration 
Policy Index). This information allows scholars to evaluate the quality and level of integration policy 
and allows comparative analyses (Huddleston et al 2011). As has been noted above, obtaining this 
kind of information for Russia is not yet possible.   
 are limited in number. They are not 
always representative, they are typically fragmented, and they do not allow systematic evaluation of 
the migrant integration process. Neither do they provide a general idea about the integration 
mechanisms that already exist in Russia, and about how they can be used/adapted/complemented by 
state policy measures for migrants integration in order to be truly efficient.  
The situation is complicated by the fact that the elaboration and implementation of migrant 
integration policy will take place in the context of established negative attitude towards migrants3
Given the absent and weak  integration policies non-governmental structures take up the slack in 
terms of migrant adaptation and integration. These are civil-society institutions, human-rights 
organizations which provide different kinds of consultation and legal services to migrants, working 
groups, migrants and diaspora associations, not to mention ethnic businesses. Finally, there are 
shadow structures which mean that migration in Russia (primarily temporary labor migration) is 
overwhelmingly unregistered and illegal.  
 and 
with the politicization of migration in Russia. There is no consensus in society regarding Russian 
migration strategy. Moreover, there are politicians’ polarising opinions and questions in public opinion 
about whether Russia should or should not attract migrants in order to solve its demographic and 
economic problems (Mukomel 2011). The subject of migration has become a political “hot potato”, 
something which creates xenophobia through mass media, speeches given by the public politicians, 
youth subculture, etc. The formation of migrant integration policy under these conditions, which, as 
has been mentioned before, implies a common, two-way movement of migrants and the local 
population towards each other, is no trivial task then. However, Russia confirms the way that the 
withdrawal of the state from this policy sphere can aggravate xenophobia and interethnic clashes. 
Despite the state’s increased interest in the subject of migrant integration in recent years, the 
weakness of integration policy in Russia remains. There is, above all,  the lack of instruments for the 
coordination of different subjects: state authorities of different levels, including local self-government 
authorities, non-governmental organizations, employers, other business structures, diasporas and 
migrant associations. 
                                                     
1 For example, there were several questions in the all-Russian population census in 2010: about knowledge of Russian, other 
languages and native languages. However, the answers to these questions do not give an idea about the role of the native 
language in the respondent’s everyday life, nor about the level of Russian language skills and other language skills 
(http://www.perepis-2010.ru/news/l1.jpg). Hence, information about the most important fact of migrant integration, 
which knowledge and use of the host country language represents, is not revealed in the Russian population census data, 
unlike, for example, US population censuses, which provides information on English language skills taking into account 
distribution of people born abroad by age, gender, race, citizenship, year of arrival in the USA, place of birth and 
education level (www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/language/data/acs/ACS-12.pdf) 
2 Recent sociological surveys of migrants in Russia regarding their integration, are mentioned in: Mukomel 2011, 
Tyuryukanova 2011, UNICEF 2011. 
3 According to the research of the authoritative Analytical Center of Yuri Levada, in the 2000s the share of those Russian 
citizens who regard the chauvinistic slogan “Russia for Russians!” positively has been solidly over 55%, and there are 
fewer who think this is “real fascism” - 19% in 2011 compared to 28% in 2002 (http://www.levada.ru/14-12-2012/) 
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Policy with Respect to Returning Compatriots  
First of all, we shall examine migrant integration policy in Russia based on the example of a special, 
most “preferential” category of migrants – Russian “compatriots” relocating to Russia from abroad. 
“Compatriots” are interpreted by the Russian legislation as: (1) Russian citizens residing 
permanently outside the Russian Federation; (2) persons who do not have Russian citizenship, but 
whose ancestors, in the direct ascending line, previously  resided on Russian Federation territory; (3) 
persons and their descendants originating from the Russian state, Russian republic, RSFSR, USSR, 
and Russian Federation, who became the citizens of foreign states (4) persons and their descendants 
who were previously citizens of the USSR and currently live in states which were part of the USSR, 
and received citizenship from these states, or became stateless persons. An important factor in 
acknowledging oneself as a compatriot is self-identification supported by public or professional 
activity in terms of the preservation of the Russian language and native languages of the nations 
residing in the Russian Federation; the development of Russian culture abroad; and the belief in 
friendly relations among the states where compatriots reside within the Russian Federation. In 
summary, then, compatriots favor  spiritual, cultural, and legal connections with the Russian 
Federation. 
It is noteworthy that, after the collapse of the USSR, the Russian diaspora abroad turned out to be 
one of the most numerous in the world. For a start, almost 40 million people for whom Russia was 
their historical homeland, found themselves in the newly independent states (former Soviet republics). 
Of these, 25 million were ethnic Russians, 11 million were non-Russian, but Russian-speakers, then, 
about 1.5 million represent other nations from within Russia, where their national language is their 
native language (Tatars, Bashkirs, Udmurts, and others). At the beginning of 2010 over 12 million 
people (7.5 of whom were Russians) returned to Russia. Thus the Russian diaspora in the newly 
independent states, though diminished, still represents a significant number, comprising some 28 
million people. 
The overwhelming majority of Russian and Russian-speakers in the newly independent states are 
concentrated in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Uzbekistan. Even before the collapse of the USSR, 
this accounted for four fifths of the Russian population residing on the territory of the USSR, but 
outside the Russian Federation. 
According to some estimates the Russian diaspora in non-CIS countries exceeds 22 million people, 
two thirds of whom reside in the US and Canada. At least 25 other countries of the world have over 
10,000 people with Russian ancestry. Then there is Germany and Israel where migration flows from 
Russia were directed after freedom of movement in 1991. Other important countries here  include 
Great Britain, Australia and Argentina (Kosmarskaya 2003) 
High hopes are vested in the Russian diaspora abroad. Russians hope that it will contribute to the 
spiritual, economic, political, and demographic revival of Russia. The demographic resources of 
compatriots residing abroad becomes relevant in connection with the serious demographic crisis 
Russia has been going through for the last 20 years, due to its rapid decrease in population.  
In Tzarist Russian, and especially in Soviet Russia emigrants were always treated with caution, and 
even with hostility. This attitude held even when people became free to leave the country. But there 
was a turning point in public perception, which began with a change in  legislators’ perception. Those 
who had previously emigrated from the country, had to be acknowledged as compatriots who should 
benefit from favorable treatment and support upon their return to Russia. However, this was not the 
case for compatriots residing in the newly independent states, as their departure from Russia for work 
in other Soviet republics, was usually only remembered for one generation.  
Migrant Integration Models in Modern Russia 
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Some compatriots found themselves in the position of an oppressed minority in the CIS and Baltic 
states. These spurred the adoption of a number of legislative acts in the 1990s aimed at interaction 
with this part of the Russian diaspora4
Only in the “Social economic development program of the Russian Federation in the mid-term (2003-
2005)” is there a precise indication of the need “to elaborate complex measures for the facilitation of 
voluntary relocation of compatriots from CIS countries and Baltic states to Russia, including providing 
necessary information about the conditions of relocation, possibilities of acceptance, settlement and stay 
in the Russian Federation, development of the system of education services on the territory of the 
Russian Federation for young people from CIS countries and Baltic states”.
. In fact, state policy with respect to the Russian diaspora in the 
newly independent states was aimed at the alleviation of their situation in their countries of residence. 
They stopped the relocation of compatriots to Russia. The term “integration” in these documents is 
used specifically in this context. Thus, in the annex to the “Decision of the Government of the Russian 
Federation” No. 1064 the term “integration” is used in the list of actions aimed at the “facilitation of 
voluntary integration of Russian compatriots in the newly independent states in the political, social, 
and economic life of newly independent states”, as well as the “prevention of mass outflow” from 
these countries. 
5
However, the implementation of the policy with respect to compatriots, in the 1990s, and up to the 
end of the 2000s, was inconsistent and controversial. It is enough to mention: the termination as of 31 
January, 2001, of facilitated procedures for the acquisition of Russian citizenship for persons who 
found themselves on the territory of other former Soviet republics at the moment of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union; or the adoption of the Federal Law in 2002 on citizenship of the Russian Federation; or, 
indeed, the Federal Law on the legal status of foreign citizens, which granted equal rights for the 
acquisition of Russian citizenship to persons who had Russian ancestry and who had left Russia, say, 
at the end of the 1980s, and any other foreign nationals arriving to Russia.  
 
 “Integration” was used in Russian legislation for the first time with respect to compatriots staying 
in the newly independent states. It is historical nonsense to claim, subsequently, that it was never 
applied to migrants arriving in Russia in order to slow down their return to Russia,. Migration inflows 
reduced significantly due to the fact that  these policies were ignored. This tendency to ignore these 
policies included integration for compatriots relocating to Russia. The “integration” of former Russian 
citizens “in the political, social, and economic life of newly independent states” was not given up 
because it was inefficient.   
The adoption of the National Program for the facilitation of the voluntary relocation of compatriots 
abroad in 2006 became a very important, if delayed, step towards the enhancement of the migration 
attractiveness of Russia. It represented the creation of real conditions for the integration of the 
relocatees by the state. The state was to undertake: to provide information, consultation, and legal 
services; to guarantee employment; to facilitate re-qualification; to pay for transportation and luggage 
fees; to pay the resettlement allowance; and to ensure the acquisition of Russian citizenship within 
several months, and other associated social guarantees.   
Initially the State program was planned for six years (2007-2012), and the presumed relocation to 
Russia of, optimistically, 300,000 persons who were historically and ethnically close to Russia. 
However, for lower numbers of people relocated to Russia in the framework of the program. This was 
                                                     
4 Orders of the President of the Russian Federation as of 11 August, 1994 No. 1681 on priority directions of state policy of 
the Russian Federation with respect to compatriots residing abroad, of 14 September, 1995 No. 940 on the approval of 
the strategic course of the Russian Federation with member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Decrees 
of the Government of the Russian Federation of 31 August, 1994 No. 1064 on actions for support оf compatriots abroad, 
of May 17, 1996 No. 590 on program of actions for support of compatriots, Federal Law of the RF of 5 March, 1999 on 
state policy of the Russian Federation with respect to compatriots abroad. 
5  Social economic development program of the Russian Federation in the mid-term (2003-2005), section 6.3. Approved by 
the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 15 August, 2003, No. 1163-р. 
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the result of restrictions on places for the settlement of relocatees; lack of assistance from the state in 
finding housing and tax discrimination;6 and also bureaucratic delays. In fact, abot 55,000 persons 
relocated to Russia within five years from 2007 to 2011 as participants in this program, while the total 
immigration inflow for these years stood at 1.3 million people.7
These results made the authorities reconsider the conditions of the program, and, then, reduced 
administrative barriers for its participants. Beginning with 1 January, 2013 the program became 
indefinite. Compatriots arriving in the framework of this program will not be as strictly tied to the 
“settlement territories”. They will have the right to find their own jobs. The restrictions on the right to 
open their own businesses are also lifted along with other points, which make the life of immigrants 
easier. The Russian regions participating in the program will gain greater independence in elaborating 
regional development projects (for example, industrial, agroindustrial, or education clusters), under 
which they will be able to form their demand for people with certain qualifications, something covered 
by immigrant compatriots. All of this will create the conditions for the successful integration of 
relocatees in Russian society. 
   
However, a historical analogy inadvertently comes to mind. Russia, or what was then the USSR, 
has already had negative experience here. Immediately after the death of Stalin in 1953 the 20th 
session of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union condemned pre-existing policy. A lot of 
compatriots went to Russia hoping to come back, or at least enter the USSR in order to connect with 
family and friends, establish business contacts, etc. Then, the USSR turned its back on them, viewing 
potential re-emigrants as “undesired elements”. It did not wish to extend a hand of friendship, and thus 
deprived itself of massive political, if not economic support, aggravating “cold war” tensions. 
  It is important to learn from this bitter lesson. Currently Russia is in an extremely difficult 
economic and demographic situation, and any friendly assistance provided by compatriots would be 
useful. But in order to attract these people, their knowledge and capital, their spirituality and political 
weight, it will be necessary to change attitudes fundamentally. To revive a strong and politically 
independent Russia and to recognize them as an integral and equitable part of that Russia, the Russian 
government should acknowledge the mistakes and unfairness of the past years.  
The first thing that needs to be done is facilitation of the acquisition of Russian citizenship for all 
compatriots who want this. This means legalizing dual citizenship, something extremely important for 
those who do not intend to move to Russia, but who are ready to collaborate and represent the interests 
of Russia in the countries where they live. Integration here goes outside of the frame of migration 
management, and becomes part of  a broader political framework. 
Temporary Labor Migrant Adaptation Policy 
The most numerous category of migrants arriving in the Russian Federation are temporary migrants 
seeking employment. In 2011, 1.2 million work permits were issued to foreign citizens, 80% of which 
were issued to CIS citizens. Besides this, 810,000 patents were issued to citizens of CIS countries. 
These patents grant holders the right to be employed by natural persons in Russia. Figure 2 presents 
the structure of the foreign labor force attracted to Russia, by countries of origin. Citizens of Central 
Asia states (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan) account for almost two thirds of work permits 
issued in Russia.  
                                                     
6 Initially participants of the Program arriving inRussia were supposed to pay income tax as non-residents, at 30%, while for 
Russian citizens income tax rate is 13%. Since 2011 participants of the Program started being treated on a par with tax 
residents of the RF, and income tax for them was set at 13%. 
7 FMS data for Russia. 
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Figure 2. Structure of foreign labor force attracted to Russia, by countries of origin, 2011, %  
(by number of issued work permits) 
Uzbekistan, 28%
Tajikistan, 15%
China, 13%
Ukraine, 12%
Turkey, 6%
Moldova, 5%
Kyrgyzstan, 5%
Armenia, 3% Other countries, 13%
 
Source: Data of FMS of Russia 
As was mentioned above, the integration of temporary migrants is a question of partial integration. 
It is most often limited to the adaptation of the migrant to working and living conditions which are 
new to him/her. An important condition for the successful adaptation of the labor migrant is his/her 
legalization i.e. registration with migration authorities and with proper permits as required by 
legislation (work permit or patent). Having legalized his/her stay in Russia the labor migrant receives 
certain rights, which contribute to his/her integration in the Russian society. 
The problem is that a significant proportion of labor migrants arriving in Russia, drop out of the 
legal sphere at this early stage and fail to legalize their stay in the country. According to estimates 70-
80% of labor migrants work in Russia illegally, without work permits, and without legally registering 
their labor relations with their employer. In other words, the real number of labor migrants staying in 
Russia may be as high as 5-6 million people.  
How can we explain the scale of illegal immigration? First, there are favorable conditions of visa-
free entry (in many cases just with “internal” national passports). Second, Russia has weak 
immigration control. But another important point is, third, underdeveloped official labor migration 
infrastructure: i.e. the public and non-public service institutions which ensure that migrants are legal, 
informed, and safe, at different stages of migration (information consulting centers, employment 
services, legal services, etc). And these are the services which represent a crucial condition for 
migrant’s access to the legal (and not the shadow) labor market and his/her integration in Russia 
throughout his/her stay. 
The issue of integration becomes particularly important when the rural background of many 
migrants is considered.  Certainly, migrants from Central Asia, arriving for work in Russia, are not 
typically from urban backgrounds. This is compounded by the fact that, very often, they have not 
studied Russian in their home country – as it was the case in the beginning of 2000s (Mukomel 2011). 
Currently, over 20% of citizens of CIS countries who come to Russia to work do not know any 
Russian at all; while 50% are not capable of filling out even the most basic questionnaire without help 
(Zayonchkovskaya and Tyuryukanova 2010).  
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Knowledge of the language of the country of stay, is likely to be the most essential condition of any 
migrant’s adaptation. Knowledge of Russian lets migrants receive information about the rules of 
employment in Russia. Knowledge of Russian, likewise, maximizes chances of getting a legal job. It 
reduces dependence on one’s compatriots in terms of employment and settlement. It expands the 
opportunities for networking with the local population. It ensures that migrants benefit from their 
rights to, inter alia, professional education and medical assistance. 
Probably due to these considerations, the issue of migrant’s knowledge of Russian in Russia is set 
as the priority issue for integration. In accordance with Federal Law No. 185 of 12 November, 2012 
amending the Law on the legal status of foreign citizens, as of December 1, 2012, touches on the 
knowledge of Russian. Thanks to this law it is now mandatory for labor migrants employed in retail, 
municipal and household services to pass an exam on basic Russian . The exam takes place at special 
centers: currently there are 160 centers at Russian and foreign universities which are accredited by the 
state to perform Russian tests. The certificate confirming that the exam was passed is now a 
requirement for obtaining or extending a work permit in Russia. The certificate can be replaced by a 
foreign education credential confirming at least secondary education and the fact that the person had 
Russian classes in the home country, or education credentials issued by educational institutions in 
Russia or the USSR.  Labor migrants from countries where Russian has the status of national language 
(Belarus) and from member countries of the Common Economic Space (again Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan) do not have to pass Russian language tests. If a migrant does not have sufficient 
knowledge of Russian, they are offered language learning services. 
The introduction of Russian language tests for temporary labor migrants caused disputes among 
Russian experts. Yes, learning Russian is an exceptionally important condition for labour migrants’ 
access to the labor market, self-fulfillment and, indeed, the surrounding community. But it is the 
possibility of studying, and not the need to pass an exam as a prerequisite for obtaining a work permit, 
especially when the system of teaching Russian to foreign citizens arriving for work in Russia has not 
yet been created. Passing the exam will cost labor migrants 3,000-5,000 rubles (75-125 euro), and for 
a foreign citizen who has not started working, this is, very often, an impossible sum of money.  
Hence, experts acknowledge the fact that the state is paying attention to the language needs for 
labor migrants arriving in Russia to know Russian. However, many express their concerns that this 
legal norm, in its current form, might, in fact, result in corruption and the even greater illegality of 
migrants rather than successful integration. These concerns grew after the statement of the director of 
FMS of Russia Konstantin Romodanovskiy “the plan is to apply this norm to all categories of labor 
migrants by 2015”.8
The ederal Migration Service (FMS) of Russia also undertake other steps to facilitate the successful 
adaptation of labor migrants arriving for work in Russia. It publishes handbooks and guides for 
migrants, explaining, inter alia: the basics of Russian migration legislation; the rules of registering 
with the migration authorities; application for extending work permits and patents; how to find an 
employer; the advantages of legal employment; liability for violating the rules of entry, stay, and work 
in Russia; not to mention useful addresses and phone numbers. A prospective form of FMS activity 
has been, in recent years, participation in the pre-departure orientation of migrants. The FMS has had 
offices in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan since 2009. These, together with the national migration 
authorities, organize courses for potential labor migrants on professional training, Russian, cultural 
traditions and behavioral norms in Russia. At the end of training graduates who have been successfully 
trained as workers are supposed to benefit from targeted employment. This practice is called orgnabor 
(organized recruitment), and migrants arriving under organized recruitment programs naturally feel 
 The only exception will be highly-qualified international workers who represent a 
relatively small group of labor migrants in Russia: 11,294 highly qualified migrants obtained work 
permits in 2011.  
                                                     
8 http://ria.ru/society/20121203/913188314.html 
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much more comfortable and confident in Russia than those who go to Russia at their own risk. 
However, the scale of organized recruitment is still quite modest. At FMS it is considered that more 
proactive involvement on the part of employers in labor migrant integration, and therefore, the 
expansion of the sphere of legal employment of foreign citizens, is a prerequisite for the improvement 
of collaboration between migrants and local employees.9
Diasporas in Russia: Integration vs. Anti-Integration Potential 
 
In the context of the discussion of migrant integration it is important to emphasize the importance of 
studying the formation of migrant communities and diasporas in modern Russia. After all, these can 
both serve as conductors of integration policy, and impede the same. 
First of all, definitions:  diaspora is a part of a nation (ethnicity) or group of nations (for example, the 
Russian diaspora which includes ethnic Russians, but also representatives of many other nations which 
are indigenous to Russia), settled outside their country of origin. Diaspora growth can occur both on 
account of subsequent relocations (for economic, political, ethnic, and other reasons), and due to natural 
growth inside the diaspora itself. The primary indicators that determines the existence of a certain 
diaspora are knowledge of the native language, studying and preserving said language for 
communication with compatriots; exposure to ancestors’ culture; unification based on self-identification 
as a part of a historical motherland (even if the diaspora member was born in another country); self-
identification of cultural affiliation; and a feeling of connection with the historical motherland.  
In Russia, which was part of a multinational country for centuries, numerous ethnic communities of 
nations from former Soviet Republics have resided and are still residing there: after the collapse of the 
USSR, in fact, these became foreign diasporas of Armenians, Ukrainians, Azeris, Kazakhs, etc. Today,  
migration has further diversified Russia’s ethnic make up. Given this situation it is  exceptionally 
important to remember how these communities can contribute to migrant integration and the 
preservation of civil peace.  
Table 1 employs data from the all-Russia population census, which took place in the Russian 
Federation in 2010. It gives a very approximate idea about the numbers of diaspora representative 
from former Soviet republics residing in Russia. It should be remembered that information about 
ethnicity is based on the self-identification of respondents. A person can, should they want, evade the 
question about ethnicity. Thus, information about nationality is missing on 5.6 million respondent 
sheets. However, in the absence of other official information, we can use this source. It is important to 
remember that according to independent estimates of diasporas residing in Russia their population is 
several times larger than population census data. Thus, the Union of Armenians in Russia estimates 
that the number of persons in the Armenian diaspora in Russia to stand at 2.7 million people10, the 
Union of Georgians in Russia provides an estimate of 300,000 persons11, the “Kazakhs of Russia” 
Association estimates the number of Kazakhs residing in Russia at 800,000.12 The largest diaspora in 
Russia, the Ukrainian diaspora is estimated to stand at 4.5 - 5 million people.13
                                                     
9 From the interview of the Chief of Department for facilitation of integration, FMS of Russia, T.A. Bazhan, 10 August, 
2011: http://www.fms.gov.ru/press/publications/news_detail.php?ID=47407 
 
10 http://www.sarinfo.org/armw/?c=diasporas 
11 http://www.georgians.ru/default.asp 
12 http://russia.kazakh.ru/article/?a=8#1 
13 http://www.pravoslavie.ru/analit/rusideo/rusvoprosukr.htm; http://www.zatulin.ru/institute/sbornik/016/01.shtml 
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Table 1. Population of Russia by Ethnicity (Nationality), 2010 (sampling) 
 People 
Total population 142.856.536 
Including:  
Russians 111.016.896 
Ukrainians 1.927.988 
Armenians 1.182.388 
Kazakhs 647.732 
Azeris 603.070 
Belarusians 521.443 
Uzbeks 289.862 
Тajiks 200.303 
Georgians  157.803 
Moldovans 156.400 
Kyrgyz 103.422 
Nationality not indicated 5.629.429 
Source: Data of 2010 all-Russian population census of the Russian Federation  
http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/perepis_itogi1612.htm  
It is important to understand that ethnic diasporas in Russia represent a controversial and complex 
phenomenon in terms of structure (Ivakhnyuk 2008). Typically, each diaspora of titular nations of 
former Soviet republics can be subdivided into three groups.  
The first group is the “old diaspora”, i.e. those who moved to Russia, most commonly from other 
republics, back in the Soviet times, and their descendants who were born in the Russian Federation, 
who are not just Russian citizens but who are completely integrated into Russian society. Generally 
these are intellectuals and public servants.  
The second group is the “new diaspora”, those who moved to Russia after the collapse of the 
USSR, within the last 15-20 years, who acquired Russian citizenship or intend to do so, and who 
acquired, too, real estate. Most of these do not plan to return to their home country. They tend to 
integrate, but there are also those who perceive Russia as a place for temporary stay, and even with 
a Russian passport they will return to their home country if economic and political life were to 
become more stable.  
The third, most numerous group, includes labor migrants who can stay in Russia for years, but  
these do not tend to integrate, and they plan to return to their home country. This is a special part of 
the transnational ethnic community; adherers of a narrow definition of diaspora are not likely to 
consider them as part of diaspora. They live separately, as a rule, they do not take part in the activity 
of non-governmental organizations of “their” diaspora. But there is an entrepreneurial core which 
performs the function of intermediary between migrants arriving to seek employment, and employers, 
who often represent part of “the new diaspora”.  
This structure has been directly or indirectly confirmed by the empirical data on Azeris , 
Armenians, Moldovans and Tajiks in Russia. Diasporas are not just social and cultural formations. 
Recently they have acquired a quite obvious economic meaning in Russia: formation of so-called 
“third sector” ethnic businesses has been observed. So far this has not been the subject of research in 
Russia, not least  because of the lack of reliable statistical data (one of the few research papers is 
Brednikova & Pachenkov 2002). This is in contrast to, for example, the United States, where this area 
has been e.g. the Cuban diaspora (see Portes and Bach 1985). Ethnic businesses stimulate the inflow 
of migrants, contribute to the integration of migrant labor in the structure of the economy, and thus 
become part of the general mechanism of stable migration interaction between countries.  
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However, ethnic businesses play a dual role in migrant integration  in the host society. Since they 
are mostly represented by enterprises/companies, which belong to the representative of a diaspora, and 
where compatriots are almost exclusively employed, Russian is not an issue. Likewise, education and 
qualifications are meaningful only inside the relevant ethnic business. Ethnic businesses needs a 
constant inflow of migrants, as these are ready to work for low wages counting on future vertical 
mobility. This provides the companies with certain competitive advantages. Therefore, ethnic business 
often becomes a mechanism providing an inflow of illegal labor to Russia.  
Joining the diaspora in Russia may mean additional opportunities: help with adaptation; help with 
employment information; help with documents; receiving medical assistance, etc. Thus, the  diaspora 
can act as an intermediary for adaptation and integration even for temporary labor migrants. It is 
important for diasporas to facilitate the adaptation of migrants, and to not replace the state regulation 
of migration processes. Experts note that “there is sometimes inverse proportion relationship between 
the efficiency of state regulation of migration processes and the participation of diasporas in such 
regulation” (Gaibnazarov 2012: 341). In other words, when the rules set by the state migration policy 
are non-transparent, and excessively complicated and artificially adjusted to corrupt schemes, the 
diaspora “takes up the slack”. _It assumes a regulatory role in the information support provided to 
newly-arriving migrants; the creation of commercial employment organizations; the creation of a data 
bank for vacancies and employment conditions; help resolving everyday issues; working and living 
conditions, health care, etc. 
We can talk about the integration or anti-integration potential of diaspora activities. This will depend, 
of course, on how much diasporas contribute or hinder adaptation and integration in relations with the 
local population (Pyadukhov 2012). This potential is seen in the example of one of the regions of Russia 
– Penza oblast – based on the infrastructure in the framework of diasporas, providing services to labor 
migrants. In the collaboration with migrants compatriots-intermediaries normally provide reliable 
information about a specific region, possible risks, threats, and ways to minimize the same. Thus, they 
indirectly perform the role of social integrators for foreign workers, who contribute to successful 
adaptation in the foreign cultural environment, something which becomes particularly important for 
newly-arrived migrants when official migration infrastructure is not properly developed. 
Certain activities performed by the diaspora intermediaries contribute to the formation of migrant 
integration settings. These are: explaining the requirements of Russian migration legislation to foreign 
workers; assisting in applying for proper permit documentation, and legalizing their status; assisting in 
learning Russian; using the resources of the diaspora social networks in order to solve the issues of 
migrant stay and employment; interacting with the leaders of migrant groups who provide control over 
their stay and activities; and providing informal patronage and protection to migrants. At the same 
time diasporas may undertake actions which contribute directly to formation of anti-integration 
tendencies among migrants. These may include: shadow services; underestimation of the importance 
of knowing Russian; tendency to organize migrant life within isolated micro-groups alienated from the 
host society; exaggerated tariffs for services; arranging for employment with employers who practice 
forced labor, deception and the illegal status of migrants; and psychological pressure on migrants 
(Pyadukhov 2012). 
*     *     * 
We hope that some of the theoretical methodological approaches outlined by us will help give a better 
idea about the essence of Russian integration policy, and the possibilities for migrant integration in 
Russia. Ideally, they will be used for implementation of the new Concept of state migration policy of 
the Russian Federation in which, for the first time, migrant integration policy is to become an 
important component of migration policy.  
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